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Summary Of U.S. "peace Plan" For Cenam Announced
August 5; Reactions In Washington &amp; Central America
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department:  General
Published:  Wednesday, August 19, 1987
On August 5, President Reagan declared that a new US peace plan for Central America commanded
the "general agreement" of his administration and the leaders of both parties in Congress. But
many Democrats expressed concern that they were being deceived and that the plan, discussed with
congressional leaders August 4, was primarily a public relations tactic devised to win support for
more contra aid. Some administration officials said it was doubtful that the plan would ultimately be
accepted by the Sandinista government by September 30, the deadline established in the six-point
proposal made public by the White House. The proposal included the following major points: An
immediate cease-fire between Nicaraguan governmenttroops and the contras, subject to verification
by the Organization of American States (OAS) or another international group. With the cease-fire in
place, the US would stop military aid to the contras and the Sandinistas would stop accepting such
aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union. Humanitarian aid could continue. Foreign military personnel
would be withdrawn from the region and the US would suspend combat maneuvers in Honduras,
"as a demonstration of good faith." A State Department official said the 55 US advisers now in
El Salvador would be the subject of negotiation, but indicated that the US would like to retain
them in that country. Negotiations would then begin among the US and the five Central American
countries, including Nicaragua, on the "restoration of the regional military balance" and other
security issues. Nicaragua would have to agree to a "plan of nationalreconciliation" that provided
amnesty for the contras and "equal rights" for their participation in the political process. Once
these political changes were achieved, Nicaraguawould become eligible for expanded trade and
aid programs, and the US would lift its economic embargo. The negotiating process should begin
immediately and end by September 30. If the Sandinistas do not negotiate, or do not agree to the
conditions set forth, other parties, including the US and the contras, would be free "to pursue such
action as they consider necessary." In brief, if the Nicaraguan government fails to accept a ceasefire
and democratic reforms before September 30, the White House would proceed with its request
to Congress for up to $150 million in new military aid for the contras. Secretary of State George
Shultz said the aim of the plan was to "bring about a change in the manner of governance" within
Nicaragua. Asked why the Sandinistas would accept such a change now, Shultz said that "terrible"
economic conditions in the region could soften the resistance of Nicaraguan leaders. Democrats
insisted they had made no promises to support additional contra aid, should the peace initiative
fail. But administration officials said that two months of negotiations no matter what the outcome
would alter the political climate and enhance the credibility of the administration with legislators
holding swing votes. Democratic leaders said that at present such a request would be defeated in
Congress. "The votes do not exist now for contra aid in the House," said Rep. Thomas S. Foley (D-
Wash.), the House majority leader, after an August 5 meeting with Reagan. Six contra leaders who
met with Reagan August 5 expressed a lukewarm reaction. They insisted that any cease-fire would
have to be negotiated directly between them and the Sandinistas. The Nicaraguan government
has consistently opposed talking to the contras. The main proponent of the US peace initiative was
Speaker of the House Jim Wright, who has worked privately in recent weeks to draft the proposal
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with Tom Loeffler, now specializing in Central American problems. (Loeffler has effectively
replaced Asst. Secretary of State Elliott Abrams in this area.) In private, some Democrats said
they were deeply disturbed at Wright's move. Wright acknowledged that many Democrats were
skeptical of the initiative but said that he had "emphatically and repeatedly received assurances"
that the administration was sincerely interested in pursuing the plan. Later, Democrats tried to
go on the offensive, saying that the administration's sincerity would now be tested. But others
remained opposed to the whole effort. Sen. Edward Kennedy read a statement on the Senate floor
asserting that the initiative "was not a serious effort" and was intended mainly "to score points with
Congress." He also remarked that it was a "fraud from beginning to end." Sen. John Kerry indicated
that the limit imposed by Washington's plan is a precondition for failure and not a precondition
toward seeking real negotiations with the Sandinistas. He said his principal reservation on the
matter is the question of entering into supposed negotiations with a number of preconditions
that must be accepted before a specific date, in this case, approximately 45 days from now. Kerry
pointed out that the Reagan administration has negotiated with the Soviet Union for 6-1/2 years for
a bilateral accord, and has yet to conclude even one treaty with Moscow. The problems in Central
America, he stated, have developed over a 60-year period. The Reagan administration has struggled
against a peace accord in the region for 6-1/2 years. Now, he said, "we have have to accomplish
in 45 days what the administration has never wanted and has been unable to bring forth in 6-1/2
years." Unhappiness was not limited to the Democrats. A group of conservative Republicans also
rebelled against the plan, saying it would slow down the momentum in favor of contra aid that
was generated by the Iran-contra hearings and the testimony of Lt. Col. Oliver North. As pointed
out by Joel Brinkley of the NEW YORK TIMES (08/06/87), Washington's "peace plan" was offered
in the full expectation that Nicaragua would reject it, a scenario White House officials believed
would help assure congressional approval of renewed contra aid. The same strategy has worked
before. When Reagan offered a Nicaragua peace plan in April 1985, Nicaraguan Foreign Minister
Miguel d'Escoto waited not even 24 hours before declaring: "What President Reagan has said is:
`You drop dead or I will kill you.'" Formal rejection followed a day later, and Congress approved
$27 million in non-military aid to the contras less than two months later. In Guatemala, Foreign
Minister D'Escoto said, "I have profound suspicion over anything Reagan does." Meanwhile, in
Washington the Nicaraguan Ambassador, Carlos Tunnermann, said, "We find several very positive
and interesting elements" that "we can work with and can be improved." Officials acknowledged
that part of the White House motivation for suddenly promoting the plan was to seize the initiative
from the Iran-contra committees. That same strategy worked last February, when the day after
the Tower Commission report was published the White House suddenly announced the Baker
appointment in place of Regan. The 1985 administration peace plan included a demand that the
Sandinistas negotiate directly with contra leaders, an idea that the White House knew was "utterly
impossible" for Nicaragua to accept, a senior official said at the time. The August 5 plan includes
no such clause, but it does say Nicaragua must "stop receiving military aid from Cuba, the Soviet
Union and the Communist bloc countries" if negotiations are successful and the US ends aid to
the contras. US officials said they doubted the Sandinistas would accept this proposal as well as
others related to democratic reforms in Nicaragua, or Washington's idea that negotiations would
begin before the contras had disarmed and disbanded. One official, who has been directly involved
in Central American affairs, said: "If the White House had thought the plan was acceptable, they
would have changed it." In September 1984, when the Nicaraguan government surprised everyone
by agreeing to sign a draft of a Central America peace treaty being negotiated then by the Contadora
Group, the administration quickly denounced the plan. The State Department said it had several
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substantive objections, although the US had not criticized the draft before. And a secret National
Security Council briefing paper, leaked to the press a few weeks later, said the administration had
"effectively blocked" a Contadora treaty, adding, "We have trumped" the Nicaraguans. In May
1986, according to a formerly secret White House document made public during the hearings, a
National Security Planning Group meeting of Cabinet-level officials and others was convened
because Washington expected that "the Sandinistas will likely proclaim that they are prepared to
sign another version of" the Contadora treaty. Washington's strategy, the document said, was to
portray the treaty the Nicaraguans wanted to sign as unacceptable to others in the region "while
denouncing the Sandinistas for refusing to negotiate." One official who attended the planning group
meeting recalled that it had been convened in part because "there was a peace scare." In Managua,
President Daniel Ortega offered to discuss the US plan with Washington. "The government of
Nicaragua invites the government of the United States to immediately initiate negotiations in
Washington, Managua or in a third country to have an unconditional dialogue to discuss the said
initiative," Ortega said in a statement that he read to journalists. He also said the meeting would
be a time to discuss as well "Nicaraguan initiatives with the purpose of developing a negotiating
process that would conclude with a signing of a just and verifiable accord that would guarantee the
legitimate interests of Nicaragua and the United States." August 6: In remarks to reporters before
the Central American summit meeting got underway in Guatemala City, President Ortega once
again addressed the US "peace plan." He reiterated that the people who pay the contras are in
Washington. "The ringmaster of the circus is Reagan. We will speak with the ringmaster and not
with the clowns." Ortega called on the Contadora Group to maintain its position in the interest
of the processes of democratic opening in Latin America, and that it should not be understood as
"saving Nicaragua." He called Reagan's proposal "positive" because he believed it was presented
in a "constructive" spirit and "we believe we can arrive at an agreement." Ortega's offer to enter
into direct negotiations with the United States was immediately rejected by Secretary of State
George Shultz, who said that only multilateral negotiations including the US and Nicaragua
would be acceptable to Washington. Shultz said it was critical to establish that no possibility exists
for Nicaragua to "decide what is correct for Central America." [Basic data from several sources,
including EXCELSIOR, EL NACIONAL (Mexico), Spanish news agency EFE, NEW YORK TIMES]
-- End --
